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In this paper, we investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete 
information and side payments. We show that a direct mechanism associated with the 
social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and 
interim individual rationality exists for generic prior distributions. We consider the 
possibility that a risk-averse principal extracts full surplus in agency problems with 
adverse selection. Additionally, with regard to generic prior distributions, we show that 
there exists a modified direct mechanism associated with the virtual social choice 
function, which satisfies budget balancing and interim individual rationality, such that 
truth telling is the unique three times iteratively undominated message rule profile. 
 
 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, D44, D60, D71, D78, 
D82 
 
Key Words: Incentive Compatibility, Budget Balancing, Interim Individual Rationality, 
Iterative Dominance, Full Surplus Extraction, Risk-Averse Principal. 
                                                 
+ This paper was written on the basis of the invited lectures at the Graduate School of Economics, 
University of Kobe, in 1996, and the lectures at the Graduate School of Economics, University of 
Tokyo, in 1996 and 2002. The research for this paper was supported by Grant-In-Aid for Scientific 
Research (KAKENHI 15330036) from JSPS and MEXT of the Japanese Government. 
* Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Bunkyo-Ku, Tokyo 113, Japan. E-mail: 
hitoshi@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp   2
1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the collective decision problem with incomplete information 
where players’ utilities are quasi-linear. Each player receives a private signal and makes 
a public announcement about this signal. Based on these announcements and the 
mechanism constructed in advance, the players collectively choose an alternative and 
make side payments with budget balancing. Each player’s utility may depend not only 
on her private signal but also on those of the other players, i.e., the players may have 
interdependent values. Their private signals may contain information about 
payoff-irrelevant factors such as their interim outside values. 
Since the players’ private signals are not contractible, each player may misrepresent 
her private signal without being punished for such misrepresentation. Moreover, after 
receiving a private signal that implies a higher interim outside value than the interim 
expected utility that she can obtain from a collective decision, each player has an 
incentive not to participate in the collective decision. Hence, it would be important for 
the players to construct a mechanism with budget balancing that satisfies incentive 
compatibility such that truth telling is considered to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 
and also satisfies interim individual rationality such that each player can always obtain 
an interim expected utility larger than or equivalent to the interim outside value by 
participating in the collective decision after receiving her private signal.
1 Ideally, truth 
telling should be described by the unique equilibrium behavior; from a practical 
viewpoint, we should achieve this uniqueness by operating only a small number of 
iterative removals of undominated strategies.
2 
The first purpose of this paper is to present a sufficient condition for prior 
distribution, i.e., Conditions 1 and 2 in Section 3, under which there exists a direct 
mechanism, irrespective of the social choice function, that satisfies budget balancing, 
incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality (Theorem 2). Conditions 1 
and 2 are certainly more restrictive than Condition C proposed by D’Aspremont, 
Crèmer, and Gerard-Varet (1990),  which is sufficient for the existence of budget 
balancing mechanisms with incentive compatibility but without interim individual 
rationality. However, with minor restrictions on the sizes of private signal spaces, 
Conditions 1 and 2 may be extremely weak. In particular, we will show that with three 
or more players, if their private signals are correlated and the size of each player’s 
private signal space is approximately fixed, then such a direct mechanism does exist for 
generic prior distributions. 
This positive result should be regarded as a distinct contribution to the mechanism 
                                                 
1 There exist many studies on mechanism design with side payments, showing their respective 
existence theorems of budget balancing mechanisms with incentive compatibility that do not 
necessarily satisfy interim individual rationality. See D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979), Arrow 
(1979), D’Aspremont, Crèmer, and Gerard-Varet (1990, 2004), Crèmer and Riordan (1985), Rob 
(1989), Aoyagi (1998), Chung (1999), and others. 
2 There exists a huge volume of studies on unique implementation with incomplete information. See 
the survey by Palfrey (1992). Most of the studies assumed budget balancing mechanisms to either 
allow no side payments or only small side payments; therefore, these mechanisms were assumed to 
require a social choice function to be incentive compatible with no side payments for its 
implementation. This paper allows large side payments and does not require incentive compatibility 
of the social choice function without side payments.   3
design literature because previous studies have failed to provide good explanations for 
the compatibility of interim individual rationality with incentive compatibility. For 
instance, according to the impossibility result shown by Myerson and Satterthwaite 
(1983), in a model of bilateral trading with independent private signals, private values, 
and zero interim outside values, there exist no such mechanisms. In contrast, this paper 
shows a possibility result in the case that the number of players is three or more and 
their private signals are correlated.
3 According to Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin 
(1995), with three or more players and correlated signals, there exists a mechanism that 
satisfies incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and a weaker version of 
budget balancing such that the expected value of the sum of side payments is 
non-positive. In contrast, this paper requires complete budget balancing so that the sum 
of side payments is always zero. 
As a corollary of the above result, we show that a player can extract the full surplus 
despite the constraints of incentive compatibility, interim individual rationality, and 
budget balancing. Crèmer and McLean (1985, 1988) showed that a principal can extract 
the full surplus in a multiagent problem, where three or more agents receive their 
private signals, but the principal does not receive any. In contrast, this paper shows that 
it is possible to extract the full surplus even when all players including the principal 
receive their private signals. According to McAfee and Reny (1992), in a model of 
bilateral trading similar to Myerson and Satterthwaite’s model, with continuums of 
private  and correlated signals, there exists a mechanism with budget balancing and 
incentive compatibility that allows the seller to virtually extract the full surplus. In their 
model, the maximal value of side payments diverges to infinity as the agents’ total rent 
approaches the value of zero. In contrast, this paper shows that it is possible to precisely 
extract the full surplus even with bounded transfers. 
As an example, we consider agency problems wherein a risk-averse uninformed 
principal hires multiple risk-neutral agents with private information. We show that it 
might be impossible for the principal to extract the full surplus either with two agents or 
with independent private signals. However, with three or more agents and correlated 
signals, it is generically possible to extract the full surplus. 
Although most previous studies on agency problems with adverse selection 
concentrated on the case of risk-neutral principals, the study of risk-averse principals 
might have a high potential ability for explaining real economic phenomena. As an 
example of this high potential ability, we consider auctions with a risk-averse seller and 
multiple risk-neutral buyers, showing that it is possible for the seller to extract the full 
surplus without harming the incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality of 
the buyers. 
The first half of this paper does not require truth telling to be considered as the 
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, the purpose of the second half of this 
paper is to show several sufficient conditions under which there exists a mechanism 
with budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality that 
allows truth telling to be considered as the unique iteratively undominated strategy 
profile. In this case, we require only two or three rounds of iterative removal of 
                                                 
3 McAfee (1991) reinvestigated Myerson and Satterthwaite’s model and pointed out that their 
negative result was based on the assumption that zero trade was efficient if the seller’s cost was the 
highest or the buyer’s valuation was the lowest.   4
undominated strategies. In particular, in the case of private values and four or more 
players, even if we restrict our attention to direct mechanisms, unique implementation in 
terms of twice iterative dominance might be generically possible. Moreover, even in the 
absence of any substantial restriction on utility functions such as private values, we 
show that unique and virtual implementation in terms of three times iterative dominance 
may be generically possible by slightly modified direct mechanisms. In other words, 
unique and virtual implementation is generically possible when the interim preferences 
of players are not common knowledge. 
Abreu and Matsushima (1992) showed the possibility of uniquely and virtually 
implementing social choice functions in terms of iterative dominance. They used only 
small side payments, constructed mechanisms that are more complicated than direct 
mechanisms, and required many rounds of iterative removal in order to achieve the 
unique strategy profile. However, several experimental reports indicate that real 
individuals are boundedly rational and that they possibly refrain from calculating the 
unique profile after practicing only two or three rounds of iterative removal.
4 Hence,  in 
practice, the use of only a small number of iterative removals would be an important 
restriction. Based on the above viewpoint of bounded rationality, the present paper 
constructed only simple mechanisms and used only two or three rounds of iterative 
removal in order to achieve the unique profile. 
The key finding is that under a slightly stronger version of Conditions 1 and 2, the 
constraint of interim individual rationality is trivial in that whenever there exists a 
budget balancing side payment function that uniquely implements a social choice 
function, there exists another budget balancing side payment function uniquely 
implementing the same social choice function that satisfies interim individual rationality 
(Theorem 8). Based on this, we only have to check the compatibility between incentive 
compatibility and budget balancing, without explicitly taking interim individual 
rationality into account. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 defines the model. Section 3 
investigates the direct mechanisms that satisfy budget balancing, incentive compatibility, 
and interim individual rationality. Sections 4 and 5 investigate the possibility of the full 
surplus extraction. Section 4 considers the agency problem with a risk-averse principal 
and multiple risk neutral agents. Section 5 considers the partnership problem with 
risk-neutral players. Section 6 shows a sufficient condition on the prior distribution 
under which the existence of mechanisms with interim individual rationality is trivial. 
Section 7 investigates the possibility of uniquely and exactly implementing the social 
choice function via direct mechanisms in terms of an iterative dominance. Sections 8 
and 9 investigate the possibility of uniquely and virtually implementing the social 
choice function in terms of twice or three times iterative dominance. Section 10 
concludes the paper. 
 
                                                 
4  For example, see Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001).   5
2. The Model 
 
Let  } ,..., 2 , 1 { n N ≡  denote the finite set of players. We will assume that  3 ≥ n , 
except in Proposition 1 of this section, Proposition 3 of Section 3, and the first part of 
Proposition 4 of Section 4. Each player  N i∈  receives  her  private signal  i ω , and  i Ω  
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Let  A denote the set of alternatives and  ∆  the set of simple lotteries on  A. We 
assume that each player  s i′  utility is quasi-linear in that when the private signal 
profile and the alternative are  Ω ∈ ω  and  A a∈ , respectively, and player  i receives 
the side payment  R ti ∈ , her utility is given by 
i i t a u + ) , ( ω . 





i i a a u u ) ( ) , ( ) , ( α ω ω α , where Γ  is the support of the lottery α , which is 
countable. A social choice function is defined by  A f → Ω : , where  ) (ω f  is 
regarded as the desirable alternative when the private signal profile is  Ω ∈ ω . 
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i  and  Φ ∈ ≡ ∈N i i) (φ φ . 
Fix the set of message profiles  M  arbitrarily. A mechanism is defined by  ) , ( x g ,   6
where  ∆ → M g :   is an outcome function,  R M xi → :   is a side payment function for 
player  i, and  N i i x x ∈ = ) (   is a side payment function with budget balancing in that 
0 ) ( = ∑
∈N i
i m x  for  all  M m∈ . 
When all players announce a message profile  M m∈ , the resultant lottery and side 
payment for each player i  are  ) (m g  and  ) (m xi , respectively. When  ) (m g  is a 
degenerate lottery, it will be regarded as a pure alternative. 
Fix a positive integer  k  arbitrarily. Let  i i Φ = Φ
0 . For every positive integer  h, 
we define  i
h
i Φ ⊂ Φ   as the set of message rules for player  i, 
1 − Φ ∈
h
i i φ , satisfying that 
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A message rule profile  Φ ∈ φ   is said to be k times iteratively undominated in  ) , , ( x g p  
if 
k Φ ∈ φ . We will use the concept of iterative dominance only in the latter part of this 
paper, i.e., in Sections 6, 7, 8, and 9, where we will consider only the case of  } 3 , 2 { ∈ k . 
In all sections except Sections 6, 8, and 9, we consider only direct mechanisms where 
i i M Ω =  for  all  N i∈  
and 
f g = . 
Hence, a direct mechanism is denoted by  ) , ( x f , where 
R xi → Ω : f o r   a l l   N i∈ . 
The honest message rule profile in a direct mechanism is denoted by  Φ ∈
* φ  where 
   ω ω φ = ) (
*  for  all  Ω ∈ ω . 
For every  N i∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , the interim outside value that player  i can 
obtain when she observes her private signal  i ω  and decides not to participate in the 
collective decision is denoted by  R U i i ∈ ) (
* ω . We introduce the following requirement 
on  x. 
 
Interim Individual Rationality (IIR): For every  N i∈  and  every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
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*
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In the direct mechanism  ) , ( x f , when all players announce their private signals 
honestly, IIR requires the resultant interim expected utility for each player to be larger 
than or equivalent to her interim outside value  ) (
*
i i U ω ; therefore, each player has the 
incentive to participate in the collective decision, irrespective of her private signal. The 
following proposition shows a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a 
budget balancing side payment function that satisfies IIR. We denote 
} 0 { : U + → Ω R i i µ ,  N i i ∈ = ) (µ µ , and  R → Ω : λ .   7
 
Proposition 1: Suppose  2 ≥ n . Then, there exists a budget balancing side payment 
function  x  that satisfies IIR if and only if 
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Proof: By using Theorem 1 proposed by Fan (1956) in the same manner as used in 
D’Aspremont and Gèrard-Varet (1979, Theorem 7), we can show that a budget 
balancing side payment function  x that satisfies IIR exists if and only if for every 
) , ( λ µ , whenever 
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ω µ ω ω ω ω ω . 
In this case, we used  } 0 { ) ( U + ∈R i i ω µ  and  R ∈ ) (ω λ   as multipliers for the inequality 
in the definition of IIR and equality in the definition of budget balancing, i.e., 
0 ) ( = ∑
∈N i
i x ω , respectively.
5 
Suppose that  ) , ( λ µ  satisfies the equalities (2) and that there exist  N i∈ , 
} /{i N j∈ ,  i i Ω ∈ ω , and  0 ≥ k  such that  k
j j
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is a contradiction. Hence, whenever  ) , ( λ µ   satisfies the equalities (2), then there exists 
0 ≥ k  such that  ) ( ) ( i i i i kp ω ω µ =  for all  N i∈  and  i i Ω ∈ ω . From the inequality (3), 
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which implies the inequality (1). 
Q.E.D. 
 
The inequality (1) implies that the sum of players’ ex ante expected utilities is 
greater than or equal to the sum of players’ ex ante expected outside values. It should be 
noted that the inequality (1) corresponds to the ex ante social rationality suggested by 
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) when  0 ) (
* = i i U ω  for all  N i∈  and  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Throughout this paper, we will assume that the inequality (1) holds. 
Similar to the manner observed in the proof of Proposition 1, even when it is 
                                                 
5  The same technique used in the application of Fan’s theorem can be found in the proofs of Theorem 
2 and Propositions 3 and 7.   8
possible to choose any set of message profiles  M , we can check that the inequality (1) 
is still necessary and sufficient for the existence of an indirect mechanism  ) , ( x g  with 
budget balancing and a message rule profile  Φ ∈ φ  satisfying  that 
   ) ( )) ( ( ω ω φ f g =  for  all  Ω ∈ ω  
and that when players announce their messages according to the message rule profile  φ , 
the resultant interim expected utility for each player  N i∈   is larger than or equal to her 
interim outside value, i.e., 
   ) ( ) | ( ))} ( ( ) ))), ( ( ( {
*
i i i i i i i U p x g u
i i
ω ω ω ω φ ω ω φ
ω
≥ + ∑
− − Ω ∈
−  for  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
We introduce the following requirement on  x. 
 
Incentive Compatibility (IC): For every  N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  i i m Ω ∈ , 
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IC implies that the honest message rule profile 
* φ  is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in 
the direct mechanism  ) , ( x f . 
   9
3. Interim Individual Rationality and Incentive Compatibility 
 
We introduce the following two conditions on  p . 
 
Condition 1: For every  2 1 2 1 ) , ( Ω × Ω ∈ ω ω , the collection of probability distributions 
on  2 1− − Ω  given  by 
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 Since  ) , | ( 2 1 12 ω ω ′ ′ ⋅ p  is  a  2 1− − Ω -dimensional vector, it follows that if       
1 2 1 2 1 − Ω + Ω ≥ Ω − − , then the  1 2 1 − Ω + Ω  vectors in  ) , ( 2 1 12 ω ω P  are linearly 
independent, i.e., Condition 1 holds, for generic prior distributions. 
 
Condition 2: For every  } 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , the collection of probability distributions on  i − Ω  
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Since ) | ( i i p ω ⋅  is a  i − Ω -dimensional vector, it follows that if  i i Ω ≥ Ω−  for all 
} 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , then the  i Ω  vectors  in  ) ( i i P ω   are linearly independent for all 
} 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , i.e., Condition 2 holds, for generic prior distributions. Conditions 1 and 2 
are not more restrictive than pairwise identifiability by Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin 
(1994). In fact, pairwise identifiability requires a version of linear independence similar 
to Condition 1 not only for the pair of players 1 and 2 but also for all other pairs. 
Moreover, Condition 2 is weaker than pairwise identifiability. The following theorem 
states that if  1 2 1 2 1 − Ω + Ω ≥ Ω − −  and  i i Ω ≥ Ω−  for all  } 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , there exists a 
budget balancing side payment function  x for generic prior distributions that satisfies 
IC and IIR, irrespective of the social choice function  f . 
 
Theorem 2: Suppose that  p  satisfies Conditions 1 and 2. Then, there exists a budget   10
balancing side payment function  x  that satisfies IC and IIR. 
 
Proof: We denote  } 0 { :
2 U + → Ω R i i α  and  N i i ∈ = ) (α α . By using Theorem 1 proposed 
by Fan (1956) in the same manner as used in Proposition 1, we can show that a budget 
balancing side payment function  x that satisfies IC and IIR exists if and only if for 
every  ) , , ( λ µ α , whenever 
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In this case, we used  } 0 { ) , ( U + ∈ ′ R i i i ω ω α  as the multiplier for the inequality in the 
definition of IC. Fix  ) , , ( λ µ α  arbitrarily. Suppose that the equalities (8) hold. Fix 
2 1 2 1 ) , ( Ω × Ω ∈ ω ω  arbitrarily.  Let 
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It should be noted that the equalities (4) hold. Condition 1 implies that the equalities (5) 
hold; therefore, 
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Since the above equalities hold for all  2 1 2 1 ) , ( Ω × Ω ∈ ω ω , it follows that 
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   ) , ( ) ( i i i i i z ω ω α ω ′ = ′  for  all  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ . 
It should be noted that the equalities (6) hold. Condition 2 implies that the equalities (7) 
hold; therefore, for every  } 2 , 1 /{ N i∈  and  every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
0 ) , ( = ′ i i i ω ω α  for  all  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′  
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Based on the above arguments and the assumption given by the inequality (1), we have 
proved that 
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U p f u
ωω
ω µ ω ω ω ω ω ) ( )} ( ) | ( ) ), ( ( {
*  
0 ) ( )} ( ) | ( ) ), ( ( {
* ≥ − = ∑∑ ∑
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈
−
− − N i
i i i i i i i i
i ii i
p U p f u k
ωω
ω ω ω ω ω ω , 
which implies the inequality (9). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) investigated a model of bilateral trading and 
showed the nonexistence of a budget balancing side payment function that satisfies IC 
and IIR. Their negative result was based on the assumption that there existed only two 
players, i.e.,  2 = n , and that their private signals were independent, i.e., for every 
N i∈ , ) | ( i i p ω ⋅  was independent of  i i Ω ∈ ω . In contrast, Theorem 2 of this paper 
assumes that  3 ≥ n  and that the players’ private signals are correlated. The following 
proposition states that when  2 = n , there may not exist a budget balancing side 
payment function x that satisfies IC and IIR, irrespective of whether the players’ 
private signals are correlated. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose  2 = n , that the inequality (1) holds with equality, i.e., 
(10)   0 ) ( )} ( ) | ( ) ), ( ( {
* = − ∑∑ ∑
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈
−
− − N i
i i i i i i i i
i ii i
p U p f u
ωω
ω ω ω ω ω ω , 
and that there exists  Ω ∈ ω ˆ  such  that 




ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ) ˆ | ( ) ˆ | ( )} ˆ , ), ( ( ) , ˆ ), ( ( { 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 p p f u f u  




1 ω ω U U + > . 
Then, there exists no budget balancing side payment function  x  that satisfies IIR and IC. 
 
Proof: From IIR and the equality (10), for every  N i∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , it must 
hold that 
) ( ) | ( )} ( ) ), ( ( {
*
i i i j i i i U p x f u
j j





We denote  R i i → Ω : η  and  N i i ∈ = ) (η η . We will use  R i i ∈ ) (ω η   as the multiplier for 
this equality. By using Theorem 1 proposed by Fan (1956) in the same manner as used 
in Proposition 1, we can show that a budget balancing side payment function  x that 
satisfies IIR and IC exists if and only if for every  ) , , ( λ η α , whenever   12
(12)   ∑ ∑
Ω ∈ ′ Ω ∈ ′
′ ′ − ′ =
i i i i
i i i i j i i i i i j i p p
ω ω
ω ω α ω ω ω ω α ω ω ω λ ) , ( ) | ( ) , ( ) | ( ) ( 
) ( ) | ( i i i j i p ω η ω ω +  for  all  N i∈  and  all  Ω ∈ ω , 
then 
(13)   ∑∑∑
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈ ′
− ′ ′ −
N i
i i i i i i j i i i
i i
p f u f u
ωω
ω ω α ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ) , ( ) | ( )} ), , ( ( ) ), ( ( {  
0 ) ( )} ( ) | ( ) ), ( ( {
* ≥ − +∑∑ ∑
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈ N i
i i i i i j i i
i ij j
U p f u
ωω
ω η ω ω ω ω ω . 
We specify 
) ˆ | ( ) , ˆ ( j i j i i i p ω ω ω ω α =  for  all  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
0 ) , ( = ′ i i i ω ω α  for  all  } ˆ /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈  and  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω , 
1 ) ˆ ( − = i i ω η , 
and 
0 ) ( = i i ω η  for  all  } ˆ /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ . 
From  2 = n , it should be noted that for every  N i∈  and  every  Ω ∈ ω , 
∑ ∑
Ω ∈ ′ Ω ∈ ′
′ ′ − ′
i i i i
i i i i j i i i i i j i p p
ω ω
ω ω α ω ω ω ω α ω ω ) , ( ) | ( ) , ( ) | () ( ) | ( i i i j i p ω η ω ω +  
) ˆ | ( ) ˆ | ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 ω ω ω ω p p − = . 
Let 
) ˆ | ( ) ˆ | ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 ω ω ω ω ω λ p p − =  for  all  Ω ∈ ω . 
It should be noted that  ) , , ( λ η α  satisfies the equalities (12). Based on the inequality 
(11), it follows that 
∑∑∑
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈ ′
− ′ ′ −
N i
i i i i i i j i i i
i i
p f u f u
ωω





i i i i i j i i
i ij j
U p f u
ωω
ω η ω ω ω ω ω ) ( )} ( ) | ( ) ), ( ( {
*  
∑∑∑
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈ ′
′ ′ − =
N i
j i j i j i j i j i i j i j i i
j ji i
p p f u f u
ωω





i i i j i j i j i i
j j
U p f u
ω






ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ) ˆ | ( ) ˆ | ( )} ˆ , ), ( ( ) , ˆ ), ( ( { 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 p p f u f u  




1 < + + ω ω U U , 
which contradicts the inequality (13). 
Q.E.D. 
 
It must be noted that the inequality (11) holds if  ) ˆ ( 1
*
1 ω U  and  ) ˆ ( 2
*
2 ω U  are 
extremely small. Hence, Proposition 3 implies the nonexistence of a budget balancing 
side payment function that satisfies IC and IIR in the two-player case if for every player 
there exists a private signal such that the associated interim outside value is extremely 
small. Further implications will be shown in the next two sections.   13
4. Full Surplus Extraction by a Risk-Averse Principal 
 
Consider the following situation in which a risk-averse principal hires n 
risk-neutral agents. Each agent  N i∈  receives a private signal  i i Ω ∈ ω , whereas the 
principal does not receive any. Each agent  N i∈  announces  her  message 
i i i M m Ω = ∈   in a direct mechanism  ) , ( x f   where the side payment function  x may 
not correspond with budget balancing.
6 Based on their message profile  M m∈ , the 
agents collectively choose the alternative  A m f ∈ ) ( . Each agent  i receives her profit 
) ), ( ( ω m f ui  and pays the money  R m xi ∈ − ) (  to the principal. The principal’s utility 




i m x )) ( ( ν , where  R R v → :  is an increasing and concave function. 
Each agent  s i'  utility is given by  ) ( ) ), ( ( m x m f u i i + ω . We assume that the interim 
outside value for each player is set at a value equal to zero, i.e., 
0 ) (
* = i i U ω  for  all  N i∈  and  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Similar to the manner observed in the proof of Proposition 1, we can check that 
there exists a side payment function  x such  that 
(14)   ∑ ∑
Ω ∈ ′ ∈ ∈
′ ′ ′ = −
ω
ω ω ω ω
,




i p f u x  for  all  Ω ∈ ω , 
and for every  N i∈ , player  s i'   interim expected utility is always equal to zero, i.e., 
   0 ) | ( )} ( ) ), ( ( { = − ∑
− − Ω ∈
−
i i
i i i i i p x f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω  for  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
In this case, when all the agents announce honestly in accordance with 
* φ , the principal 
receives a fixed amount of money  ∑





) ( ) ), ( (
N i
i p f u , irrespective of what the 
true private signal profile is; therefore, the principal’s expected utility is given by 
   ) ) ( ) ), ( ( ( ) ( ) ) ( (
, ∑ ∑∑
Ω ∈ ′ ∈ Ω ∈∈
′ ′ ′ = −
ω ω




i p f u v p x v . 
Since  v is increasing and concave, this value is equivalent to the maximal expected 
utility for the principal with the constraints of IIR for all agents. The principal can be 
said to extract the full surplus if there exists  x  that satisfies IC, IIR, and the equalities 
(14). Similar to the manner observed in the proofs of Theorem 2 and Proposition 3, we 
can prove the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: If  2 = n   and there exists  Ω ∈ ω ˆ  such  that 









ω ω ω ω ω ) ( )} ), ( ( ) ), ( ( { 2 1 p f u f u , 
then the principal cannot extract the full surplus. If  3 ≥ n  and  p  satisfies  Conditions 
1 and 2, then the principal can extract the full surplus. 
 
It should be noted that the inequality (15) holds in the two-player case if each player 
                                                 
6 The side payments between the principal and the agents are always in accordance with budget 
balancing.   14
} 2 , 1 { ∈ i   possesses high utility when she receives the private signal  i ω ˆ , irrespective of 
the other player’s private signal and the collective decision; in other words, for every 
Ω ∈ ω , 
) , ˆ ), ( ( 2 1 1 ω ω ω f u ∑
Ω ∈ ′
′ ′ ′ >
ω
ω ω ω ) ( ) ), ( ( 1 p f u  
and 
) ˆ , ), ( ( 2 1 2 ω ω ω f u ∑
Ω ∈ ′
′ ′ ′ >
ω
ω ω ω ) ( ) ), ( ( 2 p f u . 
Hence, the first part of Proposition 4 implies that the principal cannot extract the full 
surplus in the two-agent case if for each player there exists a private signal that provides 
her with an extremely high utility. On the other hand, the latter part of Proposition 4 
implies that in the case of three or more agents, the principal can extract the full surplus 
for generic prior distributions if  1 2 1 2 1 − Ω + Ω ≥ Ω − −  and  i i Ω ≥ Ω−  for  all 
} 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ . 
As an example, we consider auctions with a single risk-averse seller and multiple 
risk-neutral buyers and with private values. The seller has one unit of commodity for 
sale. Each buyer  s i'  private  signal  i ω   implies her own valuation, where  i Ω  is  given 
by a finite set of positive real numbers. The set of alternatives is given by  N A = , 
where the alternative  A i∈  implies that the commodity is transferred to buyer i . 
Hence, for every buyer  N i∈ , 
   i i a u ω ω = ) , ( i f   i a = , 
and 
   0 ) , ( = ω a ui  if  i a ≠ . 
The social choice function  f   is efficient, i.e., for every  Ω ∈ ω  and  every  N i∈ , 
j i ω ω ≥  for  all  N j∈  whenever  i f = ) (ω .
7 
The expected full surplus is given by 






ω ω ω ω ω ) ( ) max ( ) ( ) ), ( ( p p f u i N i
N i
i . 
The latter part of Proposition 4 implies that with three or more buyers, if 
1 2 1 2 1 − Ω + Ω ≥ Ω − −  and  i i Ω ≥ Ω−  for all  } 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , then the full surplus 
extraction by the seller is generically possible. However, with only two buyers, the 
risk-averse seller may not be able to extract the full surplus. For every  N i∈ , buyer 
s i'   highest possible valuation is denoted by  i i Ω ∈ ω , where 
i i ω ω >  for  all  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ . 






ω ω ω ) ( ) max ( p j N j i  for  all  N i∈ . 
This is a trivial assumption when each buyer has the same highest possible valuation. 
It must be noted that when  2 = n , this assumption implies the inequality (15). Hence, 
from the first part of Proposition 4, it follows that the risk-averse seller cannot extract 
                                                 
7 Without any substantial change of our arguments, we can allow  ) (ω f  to be a lottery over 
multiple agents whose evaluations are the highest.   15
the full surplus when there are only two buyers.   
Proposition 1 implies that if incentive compatibility is not required, the seller can 
always extract the full surplus even in the two-buyer case. Moreover, we can check that 
if we require ex ante individual rationality, instead of interim individual rationality, that 
0 ) ( )} ( ) ), ( ( { = + ∑
Ω ∈ ω
ω ω ω ω p x f u i i  for  all  N i∈ , 
then the seller can extract the full surplus in a wide class of environments with two 
buyers. Suppose that  ) , ( f p  satisfies the “sorting” condition that for every  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i , 
every  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ , and every  } /{ ~
i i i ω ω Ω ∈ , 




i j i i j i i p f u f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ) | ( )} ), ( ( ) ), , ( ( { 




i j i j i i j i j i i p f u f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ) ~ | ( )} , ~ ), ( ( ) , ~ ), , ( ( {  if  i i ω ω < ~ , 
and 




i j i i j i i p f u f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ) | ( )} ), ( ( ) ), , ( ( { 




i j i j i i j i j i i p f u f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ) ~ | ( )} , ~ ), ( ( ) , ~ ), , ( ( { i f   i i ω ω > ~ , 
where } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′  is the smallest element of  i Ω  that is larger than  i ω . Then, 
according to standard analysis, for every  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i , it follows that there exists 
R s i i → Ω : s u c h   t h a t  




i j i i i i p s f u
ω





i j i i i j i i p s f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ) | ( )} ~ ( ) ), , ~ ( ( {  for  all  i i Ω ∈ ω ~ . 
For every  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i , let 




ω ω ω ω ω
~
) ~ ( )} ~ ( ) ~ ( ) ~ ), ~ ( ( { p s s f u j j i i i , 
which satisfies the incentive compatibility and ex ante individual rationality with 
equality. Hence, without interim individual rationality, the seller can extract the full 
surplus even in the two-buyer case. 
   16
5. Full Surplus Extraction by a Risk-Neutral Player 
 
Fix any player  N i ∈
*  arbitrarily. We will say that player 
* i  can extract the full 
surplus if there exists a budget balancing side payment function  x  that satisfies IC and 
IIR where the properties of IIR hold with equality for every player except player 
* i , i.e., 
for every  } /{
* i N i∈  and  every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(16)   ) ( ) | ( )} ( ) )), ( ( {
*
i i i i i i i U p x f u
i i
ω ω ω ω ω ω
ω
= + ∑
− − Ω ∈
− . 
One of the interpretations is that before receiving a private signal, player 
* i  will  design 
a mechanism in order to maximize her ex ante expected payoff. The following 
proposition shows a sufficient condition under which player 
* i  can extract the full 
surplus. 
 
Proposition 5: Suppose that  p  satisfies Conditions 1 and 2. Then, player 
* i c a n  
extract the full surplus. 
 
Proof: The inequality (1) implies that we can choose  ) ( * *
* *
i i U ω  for each  * * i i Ω ∈ ω  
such that 
   ) ( ) ( * * * *
* * *
i i i i U U ω ω ≥  for  all  * * i i Ω ∈ ω , 
and 
(17)   ) ( )} ( ) | ( ) ), ( ( { * * * *
* *
* * * *
* *
i i i i i i i i p U p f u
i i
ω ω ω ω ω ω
ω
− ∑
− − Ω ∈
−  




= − + ∑ ∑ ∑
∈ Ω ∈Ω ∈
−
− − i M i
i i i i i i i i
i ii i
p U p f u
ωω
ω ω ω ω ω ω . 
Based on Theorem 2 and the equality (17), if Conditions 1 and 2 hold, it follows that 
there exists a budget balancing side payment function  x  that satisfies IC such that the 
equality (16) holds for all  } /{




* * * * ) | ( ) ), ( (
i i i i i U p f u
i i
= ∑
− − Ω ∈
−
ω
ω ω ω ω  for  all  * * i i Ω ∈ ω . 
This implies that player 
* i   can extract the full surplus. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Crèmer and McLean (1985, 1988) investigated the auctions of a single seller and 
three or more bidders and showed that the seller can extract the full surplus if the 
bidders’ private signals are correlated. They assumed that the seller does not receive any 
private signals. In contrast, the present paper permits the seller to receive her private 
signal and considers the constraints of IC and IIR for this seller as well as the bidders. 
The following proposition states that if there exists a player whose private signal is 
independent, player 
* i   may not be able to extract the full surplus. 
 
Proposition 6:  Fix  } /{
* i N i ∈  arbitrarily. Suppose that there exist  i i Ω ∈ ω ˆ  and 
} ˆ /{ ~
i i i ω ω Ω ∈  such  that   17
(18)   ∑
− − Ω ∈
− − − −
i i
i i i i i i i i i i p f u p f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
~
)} ˆ | ~ ( ) ˆ , ~ ), ~ ( ( ) ~ | ~ ( ) ~ ), ~ ( ( {  
   ) ˆ ( ) ~ (
* *
i i i i U U ω ω − < . 
Suppose that  ) | ( i i p ω ⋅  is independent of  i i Ω ∈ ω . Then, there exists no side payment 
function  i x   for player  i  such that for every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(19)   ∑
− − Ω ∈
− +
i i
i i i i i p x f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ) | ( )} ( ) )), ( ( {  
∑
− − Ω ∈
− − − ′ + ′ ≥
i i
i i i i i i i i i p x f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ) | ( )} , ( ) )), , ( ( {  for  all  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω , 
and 
(20)   ) ( ) | ( )} ( ) )), ( ( {
*
i i i i i i i U p x f u
i i
ω ω ω ω ω ω
ω
= + ∑
− − Ω ∈
− . 
 
Proof: Suppose that  i x  satisfies the inequalities (19) and the equalities (20). Based on the 
inequalities (20), the fact that  ) | ( i i p ω ⋅  is  independent  of  i i Ω ∈ ω , and the inequality (18), 
it follows that 
   ∑
− − Ω ∈
− − +
i i
i i i i i i i p x f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω
~
) ˆ | ~ ( )} ~ ( ) ˆ , ~ )), ~ ( ( { 
∑
− − Ω ∈
− − − − + −
i i
i i i i i i i i i i i p x f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
~
) ˆ | ~ ( )} ˆ , ~ ( ) ˆ , ~ )), ˆ , ~ ( ( {  
∑
− − Ω ∈
− − + =
i i
i i i i i i i p x f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω
~
) ˆ | ~ ( )} ~ ( ) ˆ , ~ )), ~ ( ( { ) ˆ (
*
i i U ω −  
∑
− − Ω ∈
− − − − =
i i
i i i i i i i i i i p f u p f u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
~
)} ~ | ~ ( ) ~ ), ~ ( ( ) ˆ | ~ ( ) ˆ , ~ ), ~ ( ( {) ~ (
*
i i U ω +  
0 ) ˆ (
* > − i i U ω . 
This contradicts the inequalities (19). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 6 implies that if there exists a player  } /{
* i N i∈  such  that  ) | ( i i p ω ⋅  is 
independent of  i i Ω ∈ ω   and the inequality (18) holds for some  i i Ω ∈ ω ˆ  and 
} ˆ /{ ~
i i i ω ω Ω ∈ , then player 
* i   cannot extract the full surplus. It should be noted that the 
inequality (18) holds when the difference in the interim outside values between the 
private signals  i ω ˆ  and  i ω ~  is large. It should also be noted that even if the interim 
outside values  ) ˆ (
*
i i U ω  and  ) ~ (
*
i i U ω  are equivalent, the inequality (18) holds when 
player  s i'   payoff in the case of  i ω ˆ   is better than that in the case of  i ω ~ , i.e., 
   ) ~ ), ~ ( ( ) ˆ , ~ ), ~ ( ( ω ω ω ω ω f u f u i i i i > −  for  all  i i − − Ω ∈ ω ~ . 
   18
6. Uniqueness and Interim Individual Rationality 
 
We introduce the following two conditions on  p . 
 
Condition 3: The collection of probability functions on  2 1− − Ω  given  by 
} ) , ( | ) , | ( { ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 12 2 1 12 Ω × Ω ∈ ⋅ ≡ ω ω ω ω ω ω p P  
is linearly independent; in other words, for every 
2 1
2 1 2 1 ) , ( 2 1 )) , ( (
Ω × Ω
Ω × Ω ∈ ∈R w ω ω ω ω , 
whenever 
0 ) , | ( ) , (
2 1 2 1 ) , (
2 1 2 1 12 2 1 = ∑
Ω × Ω ∈
− −
ω ω
ω ω ω ω ω p w  for  all  2 1 2 1 − − − − Ω ∈ ω , 
then 
0 ) , ( 2 1 = ω ω w  for  all  2 1 2 1 ) , ( Ω × Ω ∈ ω ω . 
 
Since  ) , | ( 2 1 12 ω ω ′ ′ ⋅ p  is a  2 1− − Ω -dimensional vector, if  2 1 2 1 Ω + Ω ≥ Ω − − , then it 
follows that the  1 2 1 − Ω + Ω  vectors in  ) , ( 2 1 12 ω ω P  are linearly independent, i.e., 
Condition 3 holds, for generic prior distributions. However, it must be noted that 
Condition 3 is more restrictive than Condition 1.
8 
 
Condition 4: For every  } 2 /{ N i∈ , the collection of probability functions on  i − − Ω 2  given 
by 
} | ) | ( { ) ( 2 2 i i i i i i p P Ω ∈ ⋅ ≡ ω ω ω  
is linearly independent; in other words, for every 
i
i i R w i
Ω
Ω ∈ ∈ ω ω )) ( ( , whenever 




i i i i p w
ω
ω ω ω  for  all  i i − − − − Ω ∈ 2 2 ω , 
then 
0 ) ( = i w ω  for  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
 
Since ) | ( 2 i i p ω ⋅  is a  i − − Ω 2 -dimensional vector, if  i i Ω ≥ Ω − −2  for all  } 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , 
then it follows that the  i Ω  vectors  in  ) ( 2 i i P ω   are linearly independent for all 
} 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , i.e., Condition 4 holds, for generic prior distributions. However, it must be 
noted that Condition 4 is more restrictive than Condition 2. The following proposition will 
be useful for constructing a side budget balancing payment function that satisfies IIR without 
harming other properties such as incentive compatibility and uniqueness. 
 
Proposition 7: Consider an arbitrary collection of functions  ) ( i v w h e r e   R v i i → Ω :  for 




i i N i




0 ) ( ) ( . 
                                                 
8 It must be noted that if  i i Ω ≥ Ω − −2  for all  } 1 /{ N i∈  and  2 1 2 1 Ω × Ω ≥ Ω − − , then it 
must hold that  4 ≥ n .   19
Suppose that  p  satisfies Conditions 3 and 4. Then there exists a collection of functions 
) ( i y s u c h   t h a t   R y i i → Ω− :  for  all  N i∈ , 




i i y ω  for  all  Ω ∈ ω  
and 
   ) ( ) | ( ) ( i i i i i i i v p y
i i
ω ω ω ω
ω
= ∑
− − Ω ∈
− −  for  all  N i∈  and  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
 
Proof: Condition 4 implies that for every  } 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , there exists  i t  such  that 
) ( ) | ( ) (
2 2
2 2 2 i i i i i i i v p t
i i
ω ω ω ω
ω
= ∑
− − − − Ω ∈
− − − −  for  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Let 
∑ ∑
− − Ω ∈
−
∈
− − + =
2 2
) | ( } ) ( { ) ( ) ( 2 2 2
} 2 , 1 /{
2 2 2 2 2
ω
ω ω ω ω ω p t v w
N i
i i . 
It should be noted that 
(21)   0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 = + ∑ ∑
Ω ∈ Ω ∈ ω ω
ω ω ω ω p w p v . 
By using Theorem 1 proposed by Fan (1956) in the same manner as used in Proposition 
1, it follows that there exists  R z → Ω × Ω 2 1 :  such  that 
) ( ) | ( ) , ( 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
2 2
ω ω ω ω ω
ω
v p z = ∑
Ω ∈
 and 
) ( ) | ( ) , ( 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
1 1
ω ω ω ω ω
ω
w p z − = ∑
Ω ∈
 
if and only if for every  ) , ( 2 1 η η , whenever 
(22)   ) | ( ) ( ) | ( ) ( 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 ω ω ω η ω ω ω η p p =  for  all  2 1 2 1 ) , ( Ω × Ω ∈ ω ω , 
then 
(23)   0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 = + ∑ ∑
Ω ∈ Ω ∈ ω ω
ω ω η ω ω η w v . 
Similar to the manner observed in the proof of Theorem 2, it follows that whenever 
) , ( 2 1 η η   satisfies the equalities (22), then there exists  0 ≥ k  such  that 
) ( ) ( i i i i kp ω ω η =  for  all  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i  and  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Hence, based on the equality (21), it follows that the equality (23) holds; therefore, we 
have shown that such a function  R z → Ω × Ω 2 1 :   exists. Condition 3 implies that there 
exists  R t → Ω − − 2 1 1 :  such  that 
) , ( ) , | ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 12 2 1 1
2 1 2 1
ω ω ω ω ω ω
ω
z p t = ∑
− − − − Ω ∈
− − − − . 
This implies that 
) ( ) | ( ) ( 1 1 1 2 1 12 2 1 1
2 1 2 1
ω ω ω ω
ω
v p t = ∑
− − − − Ω ∈
− − − −  for  all  1 1 Ω ∈ ω  
and 
) ( ) | ( ) ( 2 2 2 2 1 12 2 1 1
2 1 2 1
ω ω ω ω
ω
w p t = − ∑
− − − − Ω ∈
− − − −  for  all  2 2 Ω ∈ ω . 
We specify  ) ( i y   as follows. For every  Ω ∈ ω , 
   ) ( ) ( 2 i i i i t y − − − = ω ω  for  all  } 2 /{ N i∈  
and   20
   ∑
∈
− − − − =
} 2 /{
2 2 2 ) ( ) (
N i
i i t y ω ω . 
Based on the above arguments, it follows that 




i i y ω  for  all  Ω ∈ ω  
and 
   ) ( ) | ( ) ( i i i i i i i v p y
i i
ω ω ω ω
ω
= ∑
− − Ω ∈
− −  for  all  N i∈  and  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Q.E.D. 
 
The following theorem states that under Conditions 3 and 4, the existence of a 
mechanism with budget balancing that implements the social choice function implies 
the existence of a mechanism with interim individual rationality as well as budget 
balancing that implements the social choice function; therefore, interim individual 
rationality is a trivial requirement. 
 
Theorem 8: Consider an indirect mechanism  ) , ( x g  with budget balancing. Suppose 
that  φ   is the unique k times iteratively undominated message rule profile in  ) , , ( x g p . 
Suppose that  p   satisfies Conditions 3 and 4, and that 
(24)   0 ) ( )} ( ) | ( ) )), ( ( ( {
* ≥ − ∑∑ ∑
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈
−
− − N i
i i i i i i i i
i ii i
p U p g u
ωω
ω ω ω ω ω ω φ .
9 
Then, there exists a budget balancing side payment function  x ˆ  such that φ  is the 
unique k times iteratively undominated message rule profile in  ) ˆ , , ( x g p , and it satisfies 
interim individual rationality in that for every  N i∈  and  every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
) ( ) | ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( {
*
i i i i i i i U p x g u
i i
ω ω ω ω φ ω ω φ
ω
≥ + ∑
− − Ω ∈
− . 
 
Proof: Based on the inequality (24), it follows that there exists  ) ( i v   such that for every 
N i∈ , 
0 ) ( ) ( = ∑∑
∈Ω ∈ N i




ω ω , 
and for every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
   ∑
− − Ω ∈
− + − ≥
i i
i i i i i i i i i p x g u U v
ω
ω ω ω φ ω ω φ ω ω ) | ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { ) ( ) (
* . 
From Proposition 7, it follows that there exists  ) ( i y  that satisfies the properties in 
Proposition 7. We specify  x ˆ  by 
   ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ
2
i i i i m y m x m x − + =  for  all  N i∈  and  all  Ω ∈ m . 
It should be noted that  ) ˆ , , ( x f p  satisfies interim individual rationality in the above 
sense. Since  i y  is independent of  i m , it follows that φ  is the unique k-times 
iteratively undominated message rule profile in  ) ˆ , , ( x g p . 
Q.E.D. 
                                                 
9 The inequality (24) corresponds to the inequality (1) in direct mechanisms, which is regarded as a 
necessary condition for satisfying IIR as well as budget balancing in indirect mechanisms.   21
 
Hence, from next section onward, we will only show the existence of a budget balancing 
mechanism that uniquely implements the social choice function without explicitly requiring 
interim individual rationality. 
   22
7. Twice Iterative Dominance 
 
We introduce the following condition on  p . 
 
Condition 5: For every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω , 
) | ( ) | (
1 1
i i i i p p ω ω ′ ⋅ ≠ ⋅ . 
 
It must be noted that if  2 1 ≥ Ω , then Condition 5 holds for generic prior distributions. 
We introduce the following conditions on  f . 
 
Condition 6: There exists  R d → Ω :  such that for every  Ω ∈ ω  and every  Ω ∈ ′ ω  
that satisfies  1 1 ω ω ′ ≠ , 
) ( ) ), ( ( ) , ( ) ), , ( ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ′ + ′ > ′ + ′ − − d f u d f u . 
 
Suppose that player 1’s utility  ) , ( 1 ω a u  is independent of  1 − ω  and that player  s i′  
utility ) , ( ω a ui  is independent of  1 ω  for every  } 1 /{ N i∈ . These suppositions are 
regarded as weaker versions of the private value assumption that every player’s utility is 
independent of the private signals of the other players. Suppose that a social choice function 







i a f u f u ) ), ( ( ) ), ( ( ω ω ω  for  all  )} ( /{ ω f A a∈ . 
We specify that 




) ), ( ( ) (
N i
i f u d ω ω ω . 
It must be noted that Condition 6 holds in this case.
10 The following proposition states 
that under Condition 6, if  2 1 ≥ Ω , then there exists a direct mechanism with budget 
balancing for generic prior distributions, in which truth telling is considered as the 
unique twice iteratively undominated message rule profile. 
 
Proposition 9:  Suppose that Conditions 5 and 6 hold. Then, there exists a budget 
balancing side payment function  x  such that 
* φ  is the unique twice iteratively 
undominated message rule profile in  ) , , ( x f p.  
 
Proof: For every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , we define  R s i i → Ω × Ω1 :  in a manner such that for 
every  i i Ω × Ω ∈ 1 1 ) , ( ω ω , 
∑
Ω ∈ ′









) | ( )} | ( 1 { ) , (
ω ω
ω ω ω ω ω ω i i i i i i p p s . 
Condition 5 implies that for every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
                                                 
10  This was first suggested by Groves (1973), D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979), and others. See 
also Matsushima (1990a) for dominant strategies.   23
(25)   ∑ ∑
Ω ∈ Ω ∈
′ >
1 1 1 1






ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω i i i i i i i i p s p s .
11 
The following is the proof for the inequalities (25). Consider the maximization problem 
given by 
∑ ∑
Ω ∈≠ ′ ∈










)) ( ( ωω ω ω
ω ω ω ω i i
R q
p q q  




ω q . 
The first order condition is 
   ρ ω ω ω = − ) ( 2 ) | ( 2 1 1
1 q p i i  for  all  1 1 Ω ∈ ω , 




ω q , this implies that 
) | ( ) ( 1
1
1 i i p q ω ω ω = ; therefore, this implies the inequalities (25). 
Fix a positive real number  0 > k  arbitrarily and specify  x as follows. For every 
M m∈ , 
) ( ) ( 1 m d m x = , 
} ) , (
2
1
) , ( { ) ( ) (
} 2 , 1 /{
1 2 1 2 2 ∑
∈ −
− + − =
N j
j j m m s
n
m m s k m d m x , 
and for every  } 2 , 1 /{ N i∈ , 
} ) , (
2
1
) , ( { ) (





j j i i i m m s
n
m m s k m x . 
It should be noted that  x satisfies budget balancing. Based on the inequalities (25), it 
follows that for every sufficiently large k , every  Φ ∈ φ  and every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , if 
*
1 1 φ φ =  and 
*





ω ω φ ω φ ω ω φ ω φ ) ( ))} ( / ) ( ( ) )), ( / ) ( ( ( {





ω ω φ ω ω φ ) ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { p x f u i i . 
This implies that whenever player 1 announces honestly, then all other players have a 
strict incentive to do the same. Condition 6 implies that for every  Φ ∈ φ , if 
*











ω ω φ ω ω φ ) ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { 1 1 p d f u  
∑
Ω ∈
− − − − + <
ω
ω ω φ ω ω ω φ ω ) ( ))} ( , ( ) )), ( , ( ( { 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 p d f u  
∑
Ω ∈
− − − − + =
ω
ω ω φ ω φ ω ω φ ω φ ) ( ))} ( ), ( ( ) )), ( ), ( ( ( { 1 1 1
*
1 1 1 1 1
*
1 1 p x f u . 
This implies that player 1 has the strict incentive to announce honestly, irrespective of 
what the other players’ message rules are. Hence, we have proved that 
* φ   is the unique 
                                                 
11 This is based on the idea of proper scoring rules. For its application to mechanism design, see 
Johnson, Pratt, and Zeckhauser (1990), Matsushima (1990b, 1993), Aoyagi (1998), and others.   24
twice iteratively undominated message rule profile in  ) , , ( x f p . 
                                                      Q . E . D .  
 
Matsushima (1990a) showed a sufficient condition on the common prior distribution 
under which, with private values, there exists a budget balancing side payment function 
that considers truth telling to be the unique twice iteratively undominated message rule 
profile when the social choice function is strictly efficient. This sufficient condition 
requires linear independence of the conditional distributions, which is more restrictive 
than Condition 5. Hence, Proposition 9 is regarded as the generalization of Matsushima 
(1990a).
12 
                                                 
12 Arya, Glover, and Young (1995) also showed the possibility of uniquely and virtually 
implementing social choice functions in terms of twice iterative dominance on the private value 
assumption.   25
8. Virtual Implementation 
 
It should be noted that Condition 6 excludes a wide class of environments with 
interdependent values. By using a modified version of the direct mechanism, this 
section aims to show that a social choice function is uniquely, and not exactly but 
virtually, implementable in terms of twice iterative dominance, even in a wide class of 
environments with interdependent values.
13 We consider indirect mechanisms  ) , ( x g  
where the set of messages for each player  N i∈   is specified as 
  
2
i i M Ω = . 
At one time, each player makes two announcements about her private signals. We 
specify that  i i i i M m m m ∈ ≡ ) , (
2 1  and  Φ ∈ ≡ ) , (
2 1
i i i φ φ φ , where 
i i
h
i Ω → Ω : φ  for  each  } 2 , 1 { ∈ h . 
The honest message profile is denoted by  Φ ∈
* * φ , where 
   i i
h
i ω ω φ = ) (
* *  for  each  } 2 , 1 { ∈ h . 
For every  0 > ε , a mechanism  ) , ( x g  is said to satisfy the  − ε closeness to  f  if for 
every  Ω ∈ ω , 
   ε ω ω φ − ≥1 )) ( ))( ( (
* * f g . 
We introduce the following conditions on  ) , ( f p . 
 
Condition 7: For every  N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , there does 
not exist  R ∈ β   such that for every  A a∈ , 
β ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
ω ω
+ ′ ′ = ∑ ∑




i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i p a u p a u ) | ( ) , , ( ) | ( ) , (.  
 
Condition 7 implies that each player has different preferences with regard to the 
pure alternatives across her private signals. Since Condition 7 is weaker than Condition 
6, we can say that it holds in a wide class of environments with interdependent values. 
We introduce the following condition on  p . 
 
Condition 8: For every  N i∈ , there exists  } /{ ) ( i N i ∈ ι   such that for every  i i Ω ∈ ω  and 
every } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
) | ( ) | ( ) ( ) ( i i i i i i p p ω ω ι ι ′ ⋅ ≠ ⋅ . 
 
It should be noted that whenever  2 ≥ Ωi  for at least two players  N i∈ , then 
Condition 8 holds for generic prior distributions. The following proposition states that 
under Condition 7, for generic prior distributions, there exist mechanisms with budget 
balancing that uniquely and virtually implement the social choice function in terms of 
twice iterative dominance. 
 
                                                 
13 There exist many papers on unique and virtual implementation with incomplete information, such 
as Abreu and Matsushima (1992), Matsushima (1993), Duggan (1997), Serrano and Vohra (2000, 
2001), and others.   26
Proposition 10: Suppose that Conditions 7 and 8 hold. Then, for every  0 > ε , there exists a 
mechanism with budget balancing  ) , ( x g  that satisfies the  − ε closeness to  f  such that 
* * φ   is the unique twice iteratively undominated message rule profile in  ) , , ( x g p.  
 
Proof: Based on Condition 7, for every  N i∈ , it follows that there exist  ∆ → Ωi i l : 
and  R e i i → Ω :   such that for every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(26)   ) ( ) | ( ) ), ( ( ) ( ) | ( ) ), ( ( i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i e p l u e p l u
i i i i
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω
ω ω
′ + ′ > + ∑ ∑




for all  } { i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ . 
We will occasionally regard  ) (ω f  as the degenerate lottery that assigns probability 1 
to the alternative  ) (ω f . We specify  g  by 




i i m l
n
m f m g ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
1 2 ε
ε . 
For every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , we define  R s i i → Ω− ) ( : ι  in a manner such that for every 
) ( ) ( i i ι ι ω − − Ω ∈ , 
∑
Ω ∈ ′
− − − − − − − − − ′ − − − =
} /{
2
) ( ) (
2
) ( ) ( ) (
1 1
) | ( )} | ( 1 { ) (
ω ω
ι ι ι ι ι ω ω ω ω ω
i
i i i i i i i i i i i i p p s . 
Similar to the manner observed in the proof of Proposition 9 (the inequalities (25)), 
from Condition 8, it follows that for every  } 1 /{ N i∈  and  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(27)   ∑ ∑
− − − − − − − − Ω ∈
− − − −
Ω ∈
− − − ′ >
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) | ( ) , ( ) | ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i p s p s
ι ι ι ι ω
ι ι ι
ω
ι ι ι ω ω ω ω ω ω ω  
for all  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ . 
Fix a positive real number  0 > k  arbitrarily. We specify  x in a manner such that for 
every  N i∈  and  every  M m∈ , 
} ) , ( ) , ( { ) (
1
) ( ) (
) ( : } /{
2 1 2 1
) (
} /{
1 1 ∑ ∑
= ∈





j i i N j
j j i i i i i i
i N j
j j i i i m m s m m s k m e
n





It should be noted that  ) , ( x g  is in accordance with budget balancing and satisfies the 
− ε closeness to  f . Based on the inequalities (26), it follows that for every  N i∈  and 
every  Φ ∈ φ , if 
1 * * 1





ω ω φ ω ω φ ) ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { p x g u i i  
∑
Ω ∈
− − − − ′ + ′ −
ω
ω ω φ ω φ ω ω φ ω φ ) ( )))} ( ), ( ( ) )), ( ), ( ( ( { p x g u i i i i i i i i i i  
0 ) ( )} ( ) ), ( ( )) ( ( ) )), ( ( ( {
1 1 < − − + = ∑
Ω ∈ ω
ω ω ω ω ω φ ω ω φ ε p e l u e l u i i i i i i i i i i i i , 
where ) , (
2 1 * *
i i i φ φ φ = ′ . This implies that each player has a strict incentive to make an 
honest announcement about her first message, irrespective of the other players’ 
announcements about their first message. Based on the inequalities (27), it follows that 
for every sufficiently large k , every  Φ ∈ φ , and every  N i∈ , if 
1 * * 1
j j φ φ =  for all 
N j∈ , and 
2 * * 2





ω ω φ ω ω φ ) ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { p x g u i i    27
∑
Ω ∈
− − − − + −
ω
ω ω φ ω φ ω ω φ ω φ ) ( )))} ( ), ( ( ) )), ( ), ( ( ( {
* * * * p x g u i i i i i i i i i i  
∑
Ω ∈
− − + − =
ω




i i i i i i ks f u  
0 ) ( )} ( ) ), ), ( ( ( ) 1 ( ) (
2 < − − − − − ω ω ω ω ω φ ε ι p ks f u i i i i i . 
This implies that whenever all players make honest announcements about their first 
message, each player has a strict incentive to make an honest announcement about her 
second message, irrespective of the other players’ announcements about their second 
message. Hence, we have proved that 
* * φ  is the unique twice iteratively undominated 
message rule profile in  ) , , ( x g p . 
                                                      Q . E . D .  
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9. Three Times Iterative Dominance 
 
It should be noted that Condition 7 excludes an important class of environments in 
which each player’s private signal may have information only about payoff-irrelevant 
factors such as the interim outside values. As shown by Matsushima (2004), no 
inconstant social choice function is uniquely implementable when the private signals of 
players do not have any payoff-relevant information; therefore, players’ ex post 
preference profile is common knowledge in the sense that for every  N i∈ , every 
Ω ∈ ω , and every  } /{ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , there exists  R ∈ β  such  that 
β ω ω + ⋅ = ′ ⋅ ) , ( ) , ( i i u u . 
Serrano and Vohra (2001) also showed this result by providing an example with interim 
individual rationality. By using another modification of the direct mechanism, this 
sections aims to show that any inconstant social choice function is virtually 
implementable in terms of three times iterative dominance when the players’ interim 
preferences are not common knowledge. We introduce the following conditions on 
) , ( f p . 
 
Condition 9: There exist a nonempty proper subset  1 1 Ω ⊂ D , two lotteries  ∆ ∈ α ˆ , 
∆ ∈ α ~ , and two real numbers  R t ∈ ˆ  and  R t ∈ ~   that satisfy the following properties. 
(i) For every  1 1 D ∈ ω , 
t p u t p u ~ ) | ( ) , ~ ( ˆ ) | ( ) , ˆ (
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + > + ∑ ∑





ω ω ω α ω ω ω α , 
and for every  1 1 1 / D Ω ∈ ω , 
   t p u t p u ~ ) | ( ) , ~ ( ˆ ) | ( ) , ˆ (
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + < + ∑ ∑





ω ω ω α ω ω ω α . 
(ii) For every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 




i i i i D p D p ω ω ′ ≠ . 
 
The first property of Condition 9 implies that each player’s interim preference is not 
common knowledge. It should be noted that with private values, players’ ex post 
preferences are not common knowledge only if the first property holds. It should be 
noted that the second property holds for generic prior distributions. We introduce the 
following condition on  p . 
 
Condition 10: There exists  } 1 /{ ) 1 ( N ∈ ι   such that for every  1 1 Ω ∈ ω  and  every 
} /{ 1 1 1 ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
) | ( ) | ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 ω ω ι ι ′ ⋅ ≠ ⋅ p p . 
 
It should be noted that Condition 10 holds for generic prior distributions. Serrano 
and Vohra (2000) showed a condition on the prior distribution under which every 
incentive compatible social choice function is virtually implementable in Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium. Conditions 9 and 10 are weaker than this condition. 
We consider indirect mechanisms  ) , ( x g   where the set of messages for each player   29
} 1 /{ N i∈   is specified as 
   i i M Ω = , 
and the set of messages for player 1 is specified as 




1 1 } 1 , 0 { Ω × = × = M M M . 
Similar to the direct mechanism, each player makes a single announcement about her 
private signal, except player 1. The latter does not only make a single announcement 









1 1 φ φ φ , where 
} 1 , 0 { : 1
1
1 → Ω φ  and  1 1
2
1 : Ω → Ω φ . 
The honest message profile is denoted by  Φ ∈ φ ˆ , where 
* ˆ
i i φ φ =  for  all  } 1 /{ N i∈ , 
   1 1
2
1 ) ( ˆ ω ω φ =  for  all  1 1 Ω ∈ ω , 
   0 ) ( ˆ
1
1
1 = ω φ  for  all  1 1 D ∈ ω , 
and 
1 ) ( ˆ
1
1
1 = ω φ  for  all  1 1 1 / D Ω ∈ ω . 
The following proposition states that under Conditions 9 and 10, for generic prior 
distributions, there exist indirect mechanisms with budget balancing that virtually 
implement the social choice function  f   in terms of three times iterative dominance. 
 
Proposition 11: Suppose that Conditions 9 and 10 hold. Then, for every  0 > ε , there exists 
an indirect mechanism with budget balancing  ) , ( x g  that satisfies the  − ε closeness to  f  
such that φ ˆ is the unique three times iteratively undominated message rule profile in 
) , , ( x g p.  
 
Proof: Let 
   α ˆ ) 0 ( ≡ l  and  α ~ ) 1 ( ≡ l . 
We specify  g  as 




1 m l m m f m g ε ε + − = − , 
where we regard  ) (ω f  as the degenerate lottery that assigns probability 1 to  ) (ω f . 
For every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , we define  R s i i → Ω × } 1 , 0 { :  in a manner such that for every 
i i Ω ∈ ω , 
∑
Ω ∈ ′






1 ) | ( )} | ( 1 { ) , 0 (
i i i
i i i i i i D p D p s
ω ω
ω ω ω  
and 
   ∑
Ω ∈ ′






1 ) | / ( )} | / ( 1 { ) , 1 (
i i i
i i i i i i D p D p s
ω ω
ω ω ω . 
We define  R s → Ω− ) 1 ( 1 : ι   in a manner such that for every  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ι ι ω − − Ω ∈ , 
∑
Ω ∈ ′
− − − − − ′ − − − =
} /{
2
1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1
2
1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1
1 1 1
) | ( )} | ( 1 { ) (
ω ω
ι ι ι ι ι ω ω ω ω ω p p s . 
The second property of Condition (9) implies that for every  } 1 /{ N i∈  and every 
i i Ω ∈ ω , 




i i i i i i i i D p s D p s ω ω ω ω Ω +    30




i i i i i i i i D p s D p s ω ω ω ω ′ Ω + ′ >  for  all  } /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ . 
Condition (10) implies that for every  1 1 Ω ∈ ω , 
(29)   ∑ ∑
− − − − − − − − Ω ∈
− − −
Ω ∈
− − − ′ >
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1
) | ( ) , ( ) | ( ) ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1
ι ι ι ι ω
ι ι ι
ω
ι ι ι ω ω ω ω ω ω ω p s p s  
for all  } /{ 1 1 1 ω ω Ω ∈ ′ . 
Let 
   t e ˆ ) 0 ( ≡  and  t e ~ ) 1 ( ≡ . 
Fix a positive real number  0 > k  arbitrarily and specify  x in a manner such that for 
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1
) 1 ( 1
2
1 1 ) 1 (
1










ι ι ι ι . 
It should be noted that  ) , ( x g  is in accordance with budget balancing and satisfies the 
− ε closeness to  f . Based on the first property of Condition 9, it follows that for every 









ω ω φ ω ω φ ) ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { 1 1 p x g u  
∑
Ω ∈
− − − − ′ + ′ −
ω
ω ω φ ω φ ω ω φ ω φ ) ( )))} ( ), ( ( ) )), ( ), ( ( ( { 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 p x g u  




1 1 < − − + = ∑
Ω ∈ ω
ω ω ω ω ω φ ω ω φ ε p e l u e l u i , 
where  ) , ˆ (
2 1
1 1 i φ φ φ = ′ . This implies that player 1 has a strict incentive to make an honest 
announcement about her first message. Based on the inequalities (28), it follows that for 










ω ω φ ω ω φ ) ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { p x g u i i  
∑
Ω ∈
− − − − + −
ω





ω φ ω φ ω ω φ )) ( ), ( ˆ ( ) )), ( ( ( { 1
1
1 i i i i ks g u  
0 ) ( ))} ( ˆ ), ( ˆ ( ) )), ( ˆ ), ( ( ( 1
1
1 < − − − − ω ω φ ω φ ω ω φ ω φ p ks g u i i i i i i i i . 
This implies that whenever player 1 makes an honest announcement about her first 
message, each player has a strict incentive to make an honest announcement, except 
player 1. Based on the inequalities (29), it follows that for every sufficiently large  k  









ω ω φ ω ω φ ) ( ))} ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { 1 1 p x g u    31
∑
Ω ∈
− − − − ′ + ′ −
ω
ω ω φ ω φ ω ω φ ω φ ) ( )))} ( ), ( ( ) )), ( ), ( ( ( { 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 p x g u  
∑
Ω ∈
− − − − + =
ω
ι ι ω φ ω φ ω ω φ )) ( ˆ ), ( ( ) )), ( ( ( { ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 1
2
1 1 1 ks g u  
0 ) ( ))} ( ˆ ( ) )), ( ˆ ( ( 1 1 < − − ω ω φ ω ω φ p ks g u . 
Hence, we have proved that φ ˆ is the unique three times iteratively undominated 
message rule profile in  ) , , ( x g p . 
                                                      Q . E . D .  
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10. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated mechanism design with incomplete information and 
quasi-linearity. We showed that with three or more players and a restriction on the size 
of the private signal space for each player, there exists a side payment function that 
satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality. 
With regard to agency problems with adverse selection, we showed that the risk-averse 
principal could extract the full surplus without harming the incentive compatibility and 
interim individual rationality of the agents. These possibility results depended on the 
assumptions that there exist three or more players and that their private signals are 
correlated. We showed that the full surplus extraction might be impossible either when 
there exists only two players or when the players’ private signals are independent. We 
also investigated the possibility of uniquely implementing social choice functions by 
practicing only a small number of iterative removals of undominated strategies. We 
showed that whenever players’ interim preferences are not common knowledge, then, 
for generic prior distributions, every social choice function is uniquely and virtually 
implementable in terms of three times iterative dominance via a simple modification of 
the direct mechanism. 
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